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Service Médical du RAID*On the evening of 13 November 2015, three terrorists
equipped with military-grade firearms and explosive
jackets penetrated Bataclan, a Paris music hall containing
1500 people [1]. The terrorists started a massive execution
of the people located in the orchestra pit. Terrorists then
moved to the upper circle to take 400 people hostage.
Immediately, RAID (Research, Assistance, Intervention,
Deterrence), the French national police counter-terrorism
team, and the BRI (Research and Intervention Brigade)
were engaged. As previously reported [2, 3], these units
encompass police operators and tactical emergency med-
ical physicians, the latter being in charge of rescue plan-
ning and care delivery in a tactical environment. At the
first look, the three tactical physicians identified more
than a hundred casualties, including dozens of fatalities. A
terrorist then detonated his bomb, killing himself.
First, RAID police officers and tactical physicians pro-
ceeded to zoning. Priority was given to police operation
and safety [2]. They delimited a danger zone, referred to
as an “exclusion zone”, of which access was strictly limited
to RAID/BRI operators because of an explosives threat.
Conventional prehospital medical rescue teams remained
located outside this police exclusion zone.
While police operators were getting into position within
the theater and thus repelling terrorists, two RAID tactical
physicians performed triage in the combat zone [2, 4].
They identified about 100 fatalities. Most of the living
casualties were identified as invalid. This tactical triage did
not aim at identifying relative or absolute emergencies but
rather at organizing immediate transfer of the non-invalid
patients by themselves to a safe place. A dressing station
was located in the theater entrance, far from firearms but
still under the threat of explosives. This precluded any
conventional rescue team support.
In the combat zone, RAID tactical physicians applied
tourniquets to 15 invalid patients [5]. A further 15 pa-
tients underwent wound compression with hemostatic* Correspondence: medecins-raid@interieur.gouv.fr
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two received tranexamic acid, and two thoracic exsuffla-
tions were performed.
Once salvage therapies were performed [6], more than
50 invalid casualties were moved on physicians’ and
operators’ backs from the combat zone to the dressing
station; top priority was given to the most severe ones.
The purpose of moving these invalid patients was first to
secure them in a less dangerous zone, far away from
shooting and at a distance from explosives, and to bring
them closer to the conventional rescue teams to speed
up their subsequent extraction and transfer to a level 1
trauma center [7, 8].
Two tactical physicians joined the operation theater.
They perform damage control resuscitation to casualties
within the dressing station [9]. Several police officers
joined the dressing station and ferried the wounded to
the casualty receiving station, where conventional rescue
teams were standing under tactical physician supervision.
Owing to a stretcher shortage, casualties were first carried
out by using crowd barriers.
The initial tactical physicians then joined the assault
team to act as forward medical officers. The remaining
two terrorists committed suicide, detonating their bombs
during a final assault, without causing additional fatalities.
Because the environment remained under the threat of
explosives, despite terrorists’ neutralization, conventional
rescue teams were maintained out of the exclusion zone
until the end of mine-clearing operations. All five physi-
cians continued to perform damage control resuscitation
on invalid patients until they were transferred to the cas-
ualty receiving station. When conventional rescue teams
received clearance to penetrate the theater, all living cas-
ualties had already been extracted. The teams discovered
89 fatalities.
Owing to the mismatch between the number of casual-
ties and tactical physicians, the latter first decided to se-
cure non-invalid casualties before treating invalid patients
with severe but accessible lesions. The tangle of numerous
dead bodies might have hidden living casualties froms This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
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ceiving care in time.
Not all the concepts of damage control resuscitation
were performed. Some of the casualties did not even
receive damage control resuscitation, owing first to the
aforementioned mismatch between the number of cas-
ualties and tactical physicians and second to an insuffi-
cient amount of available medical equipment.
Maintaining conventional rescue teams out of danger
was consistent with prehospital disaster plans. This ap-
peared a safe option because mine-clearing operators
discovered a bag filled with explosives. Of note, despite
dynamic adaptation of the exclusion zone boundaries to
the threat, post hoc analysis revealed that the distance
between the dressing station within the theater and the
casualty receiving station was excessive.
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